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Governing Islamic finance: territory, agency and the making of cosmopolitan financial 
geographies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the governance of Islamic finance in two non-Muslim majority sites of 
its expansion, the United States and the United Kingdom.  The article reports on empirical 
work undertaken in the United States and United Kingdom and demonstrates how an 
alternative form of economic rationality is being constructed and practiced across diverse 
socio-spatial contexts to produce what we term cosmopolitan financial geographies. Second, 
building from recent debates about territoriality, embeddedness and relationality in economic 
geography, the article responds to calls for a more complex treatment of agency. We develop 
the concept of ‘cosmopolitan legalities’ to capture the dynamic multi-territorial, relational 
governance of IBF that melds western and Islamic financial rules and practices through the 
embodied religious authority of Shari’a scholars.  These complex legalities demonstrate the 
significance of postcolonial and religious socio-spatial contexts in the formation of financial 
markets suggestive of an evolving postcolonial political economy of ‘south-driven’ alliances 
in a financial landscape dominated by neoliberal rationalities and subjectivities.  Further, we 
illustrate how the development of IBF has, at the same time, prompted regulatory shifts in the 
United States and United Kingdom, demonstrating the ongoing co-constitution of Islamic and 
interest-based financial markets. We conclude by offering several implications of our analysis 
for the study of economic geography more broadly.  
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Introduction  
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007, Adair Turner, Chairman of the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), characterized much of the financial activity in the City of London 
as "socially useless" (Inman 2009). The crisis has reinvigorated interest in financial 
institutions and innovations that offer an alternative to neoliberal-financialization-as-usual.
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Islamic banking and finance (IBF) presents itself as one such candidate for consideration (Al-
Omar and Abdel-Haq 1996; Vogel and Hayes 1998; Lewis and Algaoud 2001) and has 
demonstrated some resilience through the current economic crisis (Shayesteh 2009; 
International Financial Services London 2010). It has even had its principles endorsed 
recently by L’Osservatore Romano, the Vatican newspaper (The Muslim Observer 2009 
2009). Although IBF accounts for less than 1 percent of global financial assets (The Banker, 
2007) there were just under US$1 trillion in Shari’a compliant assets at the end of 2008 
(IFSL 2010) and the industry is reported to be growing at 15 percent per annum  even 
through the global economic downturn (Dawson and Irish 2009). IBF involves a series of 
prohibitions on Riba (translated as ‘interest’ or ‘usury’), Maysir or Qimar (gambling and 
speculation), Gharar (excessive uncertainty), and a number of other activities deemed haram 
(including the consumption of alcohol, pork, and prostitution). More broadly, Shari’a law 
places a strong emphasis on justice, the sharing of risks and rewards, and fairness and 
transparency in financial contracts and proceedings.  
This article examines the governance of IBF in retail Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) in two non-Muslim majority sites of its expansion, the United States (U.S.) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). By ‘governance’, we refer to the way in which a variety of actors 
mobilize and adapt to territorially-inscribed laws, policies, regulations, and standards (what 
we describe as ‘legalities’) in order to shape, enable, and circumscribe particular forms of 
economic activity.  Relatively little attention has been paid to IBF’s governance (but see 
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Warde 2000; Henry and Wilson 2004; Maurer 2006, 2010; Rethel 2011) and aside from 
Maurer’s (2006) nationally-oriented engagement with Islamic home finance in the United 
States, virtually no academic studies have examined the governance of IBF in ‘western’ 
countries.  
Beyond developing literatures on IBF, however, we use the governance of IBF as a 
vantage point from which to address broader debates in economic geography concerning 
territory, embeddedness and relationality and their role in the formation of a variegated 
financial landscape or what we term cosmopolitan financial geographies. Our analysis makes 
two contributions. First, we demonstrate how an alternative form of economic rationality is 
being constructed and practiced across diverse socio-spatial contexts to produce different 
financial practices. In so doing, we demonstrate the constitutive role of territory in 
constructing multi-layered legalities that govern IBF markets in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Peck and Theodore 2007, Dixon 2011). Further, we illustrate how the 
development of IBF has, at the same time, prompted regulatory shifts in the United States and 
United Kingdom, demonstrating the ongoing co-constitution of Islamic and interest-based 
financial markets.  
Second, building from recent debates about territoriality, embeddedness, relationality 
and agency in economic geography (Peck 2005; Jones 2008; Hall et al. 2009; Larner and 
Laurie, 2010), we respond to calls for a more complex treatment of agency better able to 
grasp “[T]he actual practices of social interaction; decision-making, deal brokering, personal 
relationships and so on” (Jones 2008a, 76). In this respect, we stress that IBF governance 
relies overwhelmingly on the embodied religious authority and practices of a small group of 
Shari’a scholars who engage in ijtihad (literally ‘effort’) to interpret the Qu’ran and 
adjudicate whether or not particular financial contracts are ‘Islamic’ in different historical-
geographical contexts.  
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Third, drawing on recent literatures on cosmopolitanism, we argue that Shari’a 
scholars are both elite and subaltern cosmopolitans, and that their agency produces what we 
term -- adapting DeSousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) -- ‘cosmopolitan legalities’. 
These legalities and the dynamic multi-territorial, governance of IBF they produce, signal the 
entwined postcolonial and religious socio-spatial contexts of IBF suggestive of an evolving 
postcolonial political economy of south-driven alliances in a financial landscape otherwise 
dominated by neoliberal rationalities and subjectivities. They also illustrate, to use Peck’s 
language (2005, 162), the need for “context to be pulled out of the shadows and theorized 
more explicitly” in demonstrating the spatial constitution of agency. In our empirical analysis 
of IBF we move socio-spatial context from backdrop to centre stage and demonstrate the 
constitutive intersections of territorial context and agency to create particular forms of 
financial governance.  
The article proceeds as follows. First we review some of the key theoretical issues 
involved in theorizing the globalizing nature of economic activity before developing our 
treatment of agency and our conceptualization of cosmopolitan legalities.  We then report on 
empirical work undertaken in the United States and United Kingdom that provides two ‘cuts’ 
through the constitution of IBF in the two countries. The first cut considers the significance 
of territorialized legalities governing IBF in the United States and United Kingdom, the 
second explores the intersection of these legalities and the embodied knowledge of Shari’a 
scholars enacted through territory which together, we argue, produce the cosmopolitan 
legalities that govern IBF.  By way of conclusion, we suggest the implications of our analysis 
for the governance of IBF and for economic geography more widely.  
 
Beyond embeddedness: cosmopolitan financial geographies 
Embeddedness, territoriality and relationality 
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At the heart of debates in economic geography is the relationship between space, place, 
structures, networks, and agency.  We can begin generally, by recognizing the limitations of, 
on one hand, either overly territorial accounts of economic geographies (where territories are 
assumed to be fixed or non-porous), or on the other, overly relational, agentic and network- 
centered analyses that ignore territorial processes (e.g. Sunley, 2008). Rather, we find it wise 
to acknowledge what has been called the dialectic of ‘fixity and flow’ (Harvey 1982), ‘socio-
territoriality’ (Samers and Pollard 2010), or the term we use in this paper: ‘the dialectic of 
territoriality and relationality’ (McCann and Ward 2010). 
Another more specific means of  understanding economic geographies we describe 
here is to deploy Granovetter’s concept of ‘embeddedness’ (1985), which has been wielded 
by economic geographers and sociologists alike to describe the cultural, institutional, 
political, and social determinants of economic activity. Yet embeddedness has come under 
sustained critique,  precisely because of  the debates about relationality and networks, among 
other influences (for example Krippner 2001; Krippner et al. 2004; Hess 2004; Peck 2005; 
Yeung 2005; Jones 2008a). In a recent contribution, Jones (2008a) summarizes three general 
limitations of the embeddedness concept. First, although Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness 
sought to undermine the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘non economic’ (Krippner 
2001), Granovetter’s (1985) narrower formulation in essence, “led scholars to layer a social 
economy on top of a pre-social and untheorised market” (Krippner 2001, 797), naturalizing a 
distinction between the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ and, paradoxically, relegating markets to an 
analytical space “somehow outside, beyond, or external to the various “more embedded”, 
“more social”, or “more institutionalized” spheres of economic life” (Peck 2005,145). A 
second concern identified by Jones (2008a) centers on the long-standing anxiety in economic 
geography around an epistemology of territory and scale, although his critique is broader than 
the usual concerns about ‘methodological nationalism’ (e.g. Beck 2000; Peck and Theodore 
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2007), and highlights an unchallenged spatial epistemology implicit in the concept of 
embeddedness which appears to rely on the importance of local institutions and cultures at 
the expense of trans-local networks (see also Hess 2004; Yeung 2005).   
In what follows, however, we respond to a third critique of embeddedness which 
centers on its failure to “…capture the role of actors and agents, and of power relations in the 
global economy” (Jones 2008ap. 75).2 Specifically, Jones (2008a, 75) argues that,  
“The implicit epistemological assumptions in this [embeddedness] approach are that 
explanation of economic action can and should be located with mid-level concepts 
(firms, institutional environments, etc.), and that the more important form of agency 
resides in structures and collectives in society (such as firms), rather than being the 
product of individuals.”  
Drawing on Allen’s (2003) ‘power as effect’, Jones (2008a, 76) argues that there is “too 
much insensitivity to the degree of complexity of associations between different actors and 
agents in the global economy”, rendering “largely invisible the form of power relations that 
are important to understanding global economic outcomes” (ibid). Jones’ argument 
exemplifies the significance of poststructuralist perspectives in theorizations of the geography 
of economic activity. Such literatures focus on the assembling of calculative practices, 
rationalities and spatial imaginaries that configure political economic outcomes (e.g. Callon 
1998; Mitchell 2002; Ong and Collier 2005). The challenge, however, is to understand these 
configurations without losing sight of how uneven power relations are constituted and 
mediated over time and space (Allen 2005; Peck 2005). In what follows we focus on these 
power relations between actors and, in so doing, draw attention to some largely unexamined 
agents in the form of Shari’a scholars (but see Bassens, Derudder and Witlox 2011) who are 
rather different from the usual suspects that populate financial geographies, for example 
investment bankers (Hall and Appleyard 2009). Shari’a scholars also seem to be 
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irreplaceable in the formation and governance of IBF markets. Rather than viewing power 
relations as properties possessed by these agents, however, we demonstrate the socio-spatial 
constitution and practice of such power relations by revealing some of the shifting 
articulations and co-constitution of territorialized legalities and embodied religious authority 
that produce the cosmopolitan legalities that govern IBF.  
Having sketched the general dialectic of territoriality and relationality that frames this 
paper, along with a critical assessment of the concept of embeddedness, we move now to a 
more involved discussion of  agency by conceptualizing Shari’a scholars as ‘elite subaltern 
cosmopolitans’.  This analytical strategy moves us beyond the economic/social dichotomy of 
embeddedness debates to demonstrate the constitutive significance of the territorialized 
legalities that Shari’a scholars navigate, mobilize, and ultimately transform. In essence, we 
conceptualize IBF governance through the construction of what we call cosmopolitan 
legalities.  
 
Elite-subaltern cosmopolitans: the agency of Shari’a scholars 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of Shari’a scholars to the operation of IBF. In the 
discussion that follows, we develop a conceptualization of Shari’a scholars as economic 
actors with distinctive features; first, their agency is uniquely embodied and second, that they 
are cosmopolitan courtesy of their particular contexts, locations, and practices. Before 
moving to these two distinctive features, let us briefly outline the significance of Shari’a 
scholars to IBF. 
All Islamic banks and other financial institutions offering IBF products are governed 
by Shari’a Supervisory Boards (SSBs) comprising one or more Shari’a scholars.3 Typical 
duties for SSBs include considering ‘concept papers’ from banks outlining new or amended 
IBF products and issuing fatwas pronouncing their compliance (or not) with Shari’a 
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principles. SSBs also undertake an annual audit of bank activities and funds (in addition to 
conventional financial audits) to ensure that a bank is adhering to a range of Islamic financial 
filters
4
 (Maurer, 2005). Siddiqi (2006, n.p) suggests that Shari’a scholars are crucial to the 
legitimacy of IBF because,  
“[F]or the Muslim masses under colonial rule, western financial institutions were an 
extension of colonialism, an instrument of exploitation like other colonial institutions. 
Introducing banks and insurance companies in Muslim societies was, therefore, 
always suspect as the history of nineteenth century shows. Government officials and 
businessmen with a vested interest would have never succeeded in selling these 
institutions to the people.” 
This suggests the anti-colonial significance of Shari’a scholars, but their legitimacy involves 
a specific form of embodiment as well. Feminist theorists have demonstrated the importance 
of embodied knowledges and performances, using embodiment as a term that captures a 
sense of how economic activity is “fluid, becoming, and performed” (McDowell 1999:39). 
We argue -- and demonstrate through our empirical work -- that IBF ideas and practices are 
transferred in embodied forms, and that this has significant implications for how IBF is being 
both globalized and governed. Moreover, Shari’a scholars do not simply embody, perform 
and mobilize Islamic values and expertise, but also wield formidable and often 
unquestionable religious authority measured by their ability “to modify, in a deep and lasting 
fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people” (Bourdieu 1987, 127). Shari’a scholars 
working in IBF are an especially select group, combining as they do specialized knowledge 
of the Qu’ran, with training in fiqh al-muamalat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence), 
financial and commercial law and, increasingly, English language skills. Shari’a scholars are 
trained through educational pathways (e.g. Islamic-oriented universities in Malaysia or 
Pakistan) that are substantially different from other financial agents such as western educated 
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investment bankers. While other research on financial elites, for example by Godechot 
(2008), has argued that elites achieve their status through their role within the firm, Shari’a 
scholars’ status emanates from beyond the firm; it is constructed through their religious 
status, rather than their western educational credentials or their employment by any particular 
financial institution. It is this particular form of embodiment which we demonstrate in the 
second of our empirical sections.  
  Further, we argue that Shari’a scholars are cosmopolitan actors. At a time when at 
least Anglophone economic geography is slowly confronting its parochialisms (Pollard and 
Samers, 2007; Pollard et al. 2009; Vira and James 2011), we conceive of Shari’a scholars as 
cosmopolitans, global citizens able to think and feel `beyond the nation' (Vertovec and Cohen 
2002), spreading Islamic financial practices across borders. While cosmopolitanism is 
certainly a contested term (for a critical review of this literature, see Baillie-Smith and Laurie 
2011), the introduction of cosmopolitanism to our analysis is useful in three senses. First, it 
implies a ‘global citizenship’, which in an Islamic sense would mean the umma (a community 
of believers). Second, it suggests an openness to differences and a willingness to engage with 
the ‘other’, which is reflected in Shari’a scholars’ ‘global work’ (Jones 2008b) of articulating 
and navigating difference through transnational networks. Third, the concept of 
cosmopolitanism provides us with a framework for inserting particular religious practices and 
strategies into our understanding of agency across borders.  
Although much discourse on cosmopolitanism is Eurocentric and elitist, more recent 
work on subaltern cosmopolitanisms (Kothari 2008; Baillie-Smith and Jenkins 2011) 
foregrounds the neglected experiences of marginalized (or erased) agents. Subaltern 
cosmopolitanism captures “practices of thinking, border crossing, and connecting that are 
transgressive of the established order” (Gidwani 2006, 19). This resonates both with the way 
in which practices of IBF may challenge western financial knowledges (Pollard and Samers 
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2007) and the reality that most analyses of international financial architectures center on the 
IMF-Wall Street-US Treasury complex (e.g. Soedeberg 2004; Abdelal 2007). Yet Shari’a 
scholars also confound dualistic notions of subaltern and elite cosmopolitanism in that they 
also, and at the same time, occupy exalted positions in IBF circles and in wider Islamic 
society. Indeed, Shari’a scholars are substantially different from the usual people cited in the 
literature on subaltern cosmopolitans, for example, grassroots development activists who 
evolve into indigenous entrepreneurs or strategic brokers that counter neo-liberal practices 
(Larner and Craig 2005). Therefore, we argue that Shari’a scholars represent elite-subaltern 
cosmopolitans in that they are an elite group but also subaltern in the sense of  drawing upon 
geo-historical experiences and knowledges from the south and mobilizing wider geographies 
of faith that shape the governance of financial markets and the formation of Islamic financial 
consumers. As elite, subaltern cosmopolitans their agency also testifies to the significant 
relationship between territorial context and religious practices in the governance of financial 
markets.  
 
The production of cosmopolitan legalities: connecting territory and cosmopolitan agents 
We draw upon legal geographers, sociologists of law and legal scholars, to conceive of law 
(or policies, regulations, and even standards) not as fixed or static, but rather as ‘legality’ 
(Edelman and Stryker 2005, 530). ‘Legality’ denotes a broader focus not just on specific 
‘rules on the books’ but also their context, specifically law in action (the behavior of various 
legal actors), legal consciousness (the experience and understanding of law) and legal culture 
(common histories, traditions and outlooks of law). Thus, for all our emphasis on the agency 
of Shari’a scholars, we insist that national and other territorially-inscribed forms of 
governance (manifest in laws, policies, regulations and standards -- what again we refer to as 
legalities), remain central to understanding the governance and geographies of financial 
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globalization in general, and IBF in particular. This is because such legalities create barriers 
to, or at least re-shape any ostensibly frictionless movement of financial practices and are part 
of what we term the ‘jurisdictional stickiness of territory’.  Edelman and Stryker (2005) do 
not stress a spatialized conception of legality, yet we maintain that legalities are both rooted 
in and transcend particular socio-spatial contexts, consistent with the relational thinking 
outlined earlier and also with literatures in international law and the spaces of international 
law (see for example Jeffrey 2009; Picker 2011). Therefore we argue that the agency of 
Shari’a scholars combines and re-shapes international, national and sub-national legalities to 
produce ‘cosmopolitan legalities’.  These multi-layered legalities muddy long held 
assumptions about the alignment of national sovereignty and judicial authority or what 
Griffiths (1986,3) terms ‘legal centralism’ that asserts that law is law of the state, “uniform 
for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state 
institutions” (see also Delaney 2001).   
This plural, relational conception of legality is important for our analysis of the 
intersection of agency and territorialized legalities. De Sousa Santos and Garavito (2005, 5) 
use the term “subaltern cosmopolitan legality” to denote “a mode of socio-legal theory and 
practice suitable to comprehend and further the mode of political thought and action 
embodied by counter-hegemonic globalization”. We have conceptualized Shari’a scholars as 
elite and subaltern as only they have the status and authority to produce and reproduce 
complex, hybrid and shifting cosmopolitan legalities. These cosmopolitan legalities allow 
IBF contracts to ‘work’ in contexts where Islamic law is not dominant, in this case the United 
States and the United Kingdom. In the subsequent empirical discussion, and echoing the 
dialectics of relationality and territoriality, we demonstrate our conception of cosmopolitan 
legalities to signal the relationship between territory on one hand and the embodied 
knowledges of a unique group of agents on the other.  
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Methodology 
In what follows we report on British Academy funded research
5
 undertaken during 2006-
2008. Our multi-method research comprised three components; semi-structured interviews 
with 19 of the most senior practitioners and consultants in Islamic banks, financial 
institutions and regulatory agencies in the United States and United Kingdom; collation of 
secondary material from publically available government documents, industry-specific 
websites and newsletters and popular media sources; and an analysis (from web-sources) of 
the scholars working on all SSBs at institutions in the United States and United Kingdom. We 
identified individuals for interview from key reports, existing contact networks and referral 
from other interviewees. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity.  Interviewees were 
asked about their career backgrounds, their role in IBF markets, key regulatory issues and the 
challenges of operationalizing IBF. They were also asked a series of questions about 
international standard setting in IBF markets, the relationship between these standards and 
their institution/niche/product, and their understanding and experiences of working with 
Shari’a scholars. Eighteen of the interviews were face-to-face and one was conducted by 
telephone. All interviews lasted between 1-3.5 hours and yielded transcripts that are drawn 
upon here. We collected the data on SSBs in August 2008 on the basis of a number of 
websites and individual bank listings.
6
 In the following analysis, we present our discussion 
initially through a ‘national lens’ before illustrating some of the sub-national and supra-state 
governance of IBF. This logic reflects the territoriality of legalities which we later articulate 
with our analysis of Shari’a scholars. 
 
Governing IBF, the first cut: territorialized legalities in the United States and United 
Kingdom  
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The United States 
IBF in the United States is less developed than in the United Kingdom in terms of the number 
of IFIs and financial assets, (see Table 1) although the number of IFIs continued to expand 
during the 2000s (Shayesteh 2009). The governance of IBF in the United States is a 
fragmented affair and IFIs wishing to conduct business across state lines must be chartered 
through numerous Federal, regional (or quasi-federal) and state banking regulators.   
[Insert Table 1] 
Depending on the particular type of financial activity, the Federal dimension of 
governance involves the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities 
Exchange Commission, the relevant regional branches of the Federal Reserve, the relevant 
state banking departments, and often other state agencies. The United Bank of Kuwait’s 
demand to introduce Islamic home financing (more popularly understood as ‘Islamic 
mortgages’) in the United States in the 1990s prompted the OCC to produce two ‘interpretive 
letters’ (in 1997 Letter 806 and in 1999 Letter 867) that approved an ijara-type mortgage (a 
‘residential net lease-to-own home finance product’ in OCC parlance) and murabaha 
contracts in commercial and retail banking, including Islamic home finance (see Table 2). 
Following Maurer (2006), these interpretive letters can be viewed as the U.S. government’s 
version of ijtihad. With this precedent, the OCC could quickly approve products offered by 
HSBC’s new ‘Islamic window’, Amanah, which hastened the development of IBF in the US. 
Two years after the OCC ruling, the Financial Services and Modernization Act of 1999 
(FSMA) eliminated the 1933 Glass-Steagall requirement that banks must be either 
investment, commercial or insurance-related banks, but not all three. Islamic banks typically 
provide all of these services and so the FSMA inadvertently eliminated another obstacle to 
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the development of IBF although a free-standing, wholly Islamic bank still does not exist in 
the United States.  
 [Insert Table 2] 
The events of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter ‘9/11’), the war on ‘terrorist finance’, 
the forced, often arbitrary closure of many IFIs in the United States and a palpable 
Islamaphobia (de Goede 2003) did not deter the U.S. Treasury (in conjunction with the 
Harvard Islamic Finance Program) from holding an ‘Islamic Finance 101’ seminar in 
Washington in 2004 (and later in 2008). As Rethel (2011, 10) notes, many of the firms that 
were closed or held under suspicion in the first few years after 9/11 were “quietly 
exonerated”.  Since 2002, the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve have more proactively 
supported the development of IBF, and U.S. government officials have made trips to the Gulf 
States and Malaysia to push the attractiveness and welcoming landscape of the US banking 
regulatory framework. In 2004, President Bush appointed Mahmoud El-Gamal, a Professor of 
Economics at Rice University, to be the White House’s first Islamic financial advisor.  
Yet the growth of IBF in the United States has not proceeded without obstacles during 
the 2000s. Adapting Islamic contracts to U.S. banking laws continued to vex regulators and 
IFIs alike. Our interviewees cited the general complexity of banking and financial regulations 
and difficulties with specific forms of contract (Source B, D). For example, in IBF there is no 
category equivalent to that of a ‘deposit’ and forms of Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS), akin to 
joint investments between banks and depositors, oblige an IFI and its customers to share both 
gains and losses. As William Rutledge (2005,1), Executive Vice President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York pointed out, “offering a profit-and-loss sharing deposit is a 
particularly difficult proposition under a western framework, which takes the certainty of the 
deposit principle as a given”. 
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Added to this are restrictions on the range of permissible investments that commercial 
banks hold and the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, which mandates advance 
disclosure of Annual Percentage Rate (APR) interest charges, which jar with IBF principles.  
For all these obstacles and the complexities of navigating multiple regulators, industry 
commentators and our interviewees alike argue that more knowledgeable Federal regulators, 
legal firms and other financial consultants are improving the landscape for IBF in the United 
States (Dar 2009; Shayesteh 2009, Source B, D).   
 In addition to these nationally-centered legislation and policies, IBF governance also 
entails legalities produced through international organizations and sub-national institutions. 
Concerning the former, our interviewees cited the significance of the not-for-profit 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) based in 
Manama. AAOIFI has assumed a leadership role in fostering international standard-setting 
and works to harmonize IBF standards for accounting, auditing, capital adequacy, corporate 
governance, and ethics for commercial and retail banking across the world.  AAOIFI has a 
number of different membership categories, and at least one of our banks had joined AAOIFI 
as a full member in November 2008; others banks reported ‘that they were in frequent 
conversation’ or ‘had considerable engagement’ with AAOIFI.  
Another pivotal international standard-setting institution is the Kuala Lumpur-based 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) which has become central to the governance of the 
sukuk (Islamic bond) market. Operating since 2003, the IFSB contains some 195 ‘observer 
member’ IFIs, and seeks to combine Shari’a principles with international and ‘conventional’ 
risk and capital adequacy guidelines. In this sense, it is the equivalent of the Basel Committee 
and relies on Basel II to provide standards for IFIs. However, it was less relevant to the retail 
IFIs we interviewed, but more important for investment-oriented IFIs or interest-based banks 
and financial institutions with ‘Islamic windows’. Only one of the IFIs we interviewed in 
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both the United States and the United Kingdom was registered as an IFSB ‘observer 
member’. In addition to AAOIFI and the IFSB, IFIs seek guidance and approval from the 
Bahrain-based Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), while investment and capital 
markets rely on the International Islamic Financial Market organization as well as the 
Liquidity Management Centre. These international organizations appear to be driven, Rethel 
(2011) argues, by the need to normalize or legitimate the practice of IFIs in the face of 
interest-based financial institutions and ratings agencies. 
Concerning the sub-national dimension, the alliances formed in Minnesota by the 
‘Midwestern Community Bank’7 (headquartered in Chicago), exemplify how IFIs in the 
United States need to negotiate multiple territorialities in order to establish themselves and to 
expand (Source D). As another of our interviewees put it (Source B) “each state is like a 
foreign country” in terms of navigating diverse legal requirements involving the sale of real 
estate, customer protection, disclosure and mortgage fees. One banker from the ‘Mid-Atlantic 
Islamic Financial Company’ (Source B) commented on the extreme difficulty of establishing 
a presence in the state of Texas in order to sell Islamic home finance, given the complexity of 
Texan real estate law. Similarly, the ‘Islamic Mortgage Bank’ reported spending “millions of 
dollars” in legal fees, customizing its products for different U.S. states. 
 
The United Kingdom   
The United Kingdom, and particularly London, is without a doubt the center of IBF in ‘the 
west’ and home to nearly half of the 50 IFIs in non-Muslim majority countries (IFSL 2010). 
Similarly, it has been ranked 8
th
 in the world in terms of the total amount of Shari’a-
compliant assets ($18.1 billion) (HM Treasury and FSA 2008). Until 2010, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) remained the key regulator in the tri-partite structure of governance 
(FSA, Bank of England, and HM Treasury) overseeing all banks and financial institutions in 
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the UK since 1987. In order to establish an Islamic bank or financial institution under this 
system, bank authorities had to apply for approval under Part IV of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Prior to the 2000s, the regulatory landscape for Islamic financial 
institutions remained difficult and institutions wishing to offer Islamic products in the United 
Kingdom faced four obstacles. Three of these concerned the ‘regulatory definition of 
products’, ‘the role of Shari’a scholars’ and ‘financial promotions’ (FSA 2007). These 
related, respectively, to IFIs needing to acquire the correct scope of permission for their 
activities, clarifying for the FSA whether their Shari’a scholars performed an advisory or 
executive role
8
 and the need for all advertising to identify the risks as well as the benefits of 
Islamic products. The fourth obstacle (identical to the problem in the US) entailed the FSA’s 
requirement that customer deposits in Islamic banks were fully guaranteed. 
In addition to unfavorable tax laws affecting Islamic products (FSA 2007) there were 
also obstacles affecting specific product markets. For instance, Islamic home finance used to 
attract double stamp duty
9
  -- once on the sale of the house to the bank and then once on its 
subsequent re-selling to the purchaser -- until the law was changed in 2003. In response, 
HSBC’s Amanah division (an ‘Islamic window’) offered an ijara mortgage in 2002 in order 
to avoid double stamp duty.  
The growth of IBF was boosted by the UK government’s proactive stance towards 
IBF. In 2006, for example, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown called for 
London to be the European capital of IBF and the City of London’s marketing and 
promotional organization (City UK) extolled the flexibility of UK regulation for this purpose 
(IFSL 2008). HM Treasury also set out key UK government objectives with respect to IBF 
(HM Treasury 2008,5),  
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“First, to establish and maintain London as Europe’s gateway to international Islamic 
finance. Second, to ensure that nobody in the UK is denied access to competitively 
priced financial products on account of their faith.”  
In essence, promoting IBF played to discourses about the international competitiveness of the 
City and an inclusive model of financial citizenship that could embrace Islamic faith while 
also feeding Shari’a-compliant funding streams into housing and, through the Prince of 
Wales’ Trust, business loans for Muslim entrepreneurs.10  
Key regulatory changes eliminated double stamp duty in the Finance Act (2003), 
adjusted the negative tax consequences of Islamic home finance and provided what the FSA 
(2007) called a ‘level playing field’ for IBF in the United Kingdom. Support for a ‘level 
playing field’, however, quickly prompted concerns about ‘special favors’ for IFIs. For 
example, HM Treasury were concerned about any unintended consequences of regulatory 
changes that unwittingly opened up new tax loopholes (Source G), indicative of the relational 
co-constitution of Islamic and interest-based financial markets.  These changes facilitated the 
establishment in September 2004 of the first wholly Islamic bank operating outside a 
Muslim-majority country: the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB). By 2005 other banks were 
“queuing up like planes on a runway” to seek FSA approval to offer Islamic products (Source 
G). Further reforms in the Finance Acts of 2005 and 2006, enabled murabaha, diminishing 
musharaka and mudarabah contracts (typically for home finance) by changing their tax 
treatment. The decision making for these changes involved consultation with joint 
industry/government working groups such as the Islamic Finance Experts Group and the Tax 
Technical Working Group, NGOs such as the Muslim Council of Britain and other 
government institutions such as HM Revenue and Customs. The Finance Acts of 2007 and 
2008 modified the tax treatment of sukuk (Islamic bonds) to resemble other debt instruments 
(HM Treasury, 2008; HM Treasury and FSA 2008) and in April 2008, the FSA approved the 
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first takaful (Islamic insurance) provider in the United Kingdom and Europe for car and home 
ownership.   
For all the willingness of UK regulators to adjust regulations to facilitate IBF, 
however, there are ongoing difficulties. For example, London’s IBF markets are linked with 
those of Dubai and the sukuk defaults in Dubai and the Gulf States in 2009 raised questions 
about the intricate legalities of sukuk markets. Specifically, while sukuk documents are 
constructed through English law, it remained unclear whether Dubai courts were willing to 
honor English law (IFSL 2010, 4). As the HM Treasury and the FSA noted in 2008,  
“Classifying Islamic financial instruments under existing regulatory frameworks has 
posed challenges. Although sukuk are designed to replicate the economic function of 
conventional financial products, their legal structures are different and it has therefore 
proved difficult to map these products into the existing legal framework” (HM 
Treasury/FSA 2008, 22).  
As in the United States, IFIs in the United Kingdom reported frequent consultation 
with AAOIFI, Basel II, the IFSB, and IIRA, depending on the products they offer. London’s 
involvement in the global sukuk market (to a much greater degree than New York) means that 
Islamic securities and investment firms involved in sukuk trading with especially the Gulf 
States and Malaysia may have more engagement with the IFSB than U.S. IFIs.  
Our comparative research thus far makes three contributions. First, it suggests that the 
UK legal and regulatory lattice through which IBF is governed is more centralized than in the 
United States, that there are non-trivial differences in the territorialized legalities that shape 
IBF practices in both contexts. Second and relatedly, it demonstrates the enduring territorial 
or jurisdictional stickiness of the governance of financial activity, even as it is developed 
through supra- or trans-state and non-state networks. Third, it illustrates the relational co-
constitution of Islamic and interest-based financial markets in that the emergence of some 
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heterogeneous practices of IBF has prompted regulatory shifts in the U.S. and UK financial 
regulation. To understand how this co-constitution works in practice, however, we explore 
the practices of Shari’a scholars who navigate this territorialized regulatory unevenness and, 
in so doing, produce the cosmopolitan legalities that govern IBF.  
 
Governing IBF, the second cut: embodied cosmopolitan legalities  
Our bank sources in the United States and United Kingdom reported no fixed rules in terms 
of the size of their SSBs, but most operated with between 3-6 scholars at any one time. 
Scholars performed their duties through regular contact by email, conference calls and a 
series of face-to-face meetings; some banks reported 1-2 meetings a year, others had a 
minimum of four meetings in a year.  There was considerable flexibility reported in dealings 
with Shari’a scholars, however, in recognition of their hectic schedules and the difficulties in 
scheduling face-to-face meetings.  
Shari’a scholars working in IBF are a small and specialized group. As one of our 
sources observed, 
They work very, very hard. They are very knowledgeable. They come from different 
backgrounds, some are economists, others are jurists…very scholarly people and they 
are not under the illusion that this system is perfect. But they have the enlightenment 
to know that something is better than nothing. There are 35-40 scholars worldwide 
who have the authority [Source A]. 
Our analysis of all UK financial institutions offering Islamic products in August 2008 found 
that 22 IFIs operated with the approval of 30 Shari’a scholars; for U.S. IFIs the figure was 34 
and no less than 19 of those scholars were shared with the UK IFIs. The most widely 
employed scholars and their regional foci are seen in Table 3. Sheikh Nizam Yaquby (Figure 
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1) sits on over 40 SSBs, while UBS and HSBC Amanah are among the 41 institutions that 
seek advice from Mohammed Elgari in Saudi Arabia.  
[insert Table 3, Figure 1] 
IFIs in both the United States and United Kingdom stressed that it is essential to 
secure the services of the ‘right’ scholars for the demographics of their customers because, 
“understanding is very fragmented, so people will follow one scholar in Egypt and no one 
else” (Source B).  
“It’s very important. For example, for customers from the sub-continent [Scholar X], 
everyone knows him, because he has got credibility. I have worked with him for 18 
years and he will read every single word in the document and our boys in the bank 
would love him because they learned so much, they would ask him why are you 
objecting to this? If you had [Scholar Y] in Saudi Arabia, no questions; people trust 
him. Now the approach there to Shari’a scholars is quite different; people on the sub-
continent would still approach [Scholar X] and ask him questions. Nobody would ask 
a question of [Scholar Y] in Saudi Arabia. Nobody. Because they have so much trust 
in him and if he says something, that is the final word (Source A).  
Our findings support those of Maurer (2006) whose U.S. based research found that 
endorsement by a prominent scholar, and not the properties of the mortgage product, is the 
decisive factor influencing consumer acceptance of Islamic mortgages.  
 Thus, a recurring theme stressed in interviews was the significance attached to the 
role of Shari’a scholars in helping IFIs ‘educate’ consumers and, in essence, construct 
cosmopolitan consumer identities to support demand for IBF products. As one of our U.S. 
interviewees observed, “there is no consumer education at all, there is no knowledge base” 
(Source B). A UK source concurred, suggesting that consumer education was “the number 
one issue” (Source C). Another source observed,   
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“the take up in the UK was initially slow and education was, in the financial services 
area, was lower than in America, and especially in the Muslim population…so my 
team was always conducting seminars around the country and then we went to 
Muslim community centers, Muslim schools, mosques. We did this because we 
genuinely believed and we still believe that this is a sign of hope for the Muslim 
community; if they become home owners, business owners, they become 
stakeholders, without feeling any less in their own lives, without feeling that they 
have to let go of something that is so close to their heart, then they will feel proud of 
their country and they will have a sense of this is our country” (Source A). 
One UK bank secured the services of two renowned Shari’a scholars to undertake a series of 
‘road shows’ to raise awareness of IBF in different parts of the UK (Source A, D).  At these 
events, attended by up to 400 people, the bank advertised their Islamic products and then had 
a question and answer session where attendees could question the scholars about the Islamic 
credentials of the products.  
The scarcity of Shari’a scholars is a significant problem for industry insiders and 
regulators alike. For the UK’s FSA (2007), for example, the presence of scholars on multiple 
SSBs raises concerns over the rigor of their oversight. For banks, the heavy work load of 
existing scholars means longer lead in times for new products and spiraling fees which have 
risen seven-fold since 2002 (Anonymous 2007) although we found one U.S. IFI for whom a 
scholar performed his duties gratis. Renowned scholars can earn between $50,000 - $100,000 
annually per SSB through retainer fees, fees for issuing edicts, audit fees and documentation 
fees (Pasha 2010). Relatedly, the sources and mechanisms which (re)produce Shari’a 
scholars are far from transparent or standardized (source F). This is a sensitive subject and 
few interviewees felt comfortable talking about it although two interviewees (Sources A, F) 
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described a model in which young and promising scholars would be mentored by an 
established scholar. As Abbas (2008a, n.p.) notes, 
“ The chief of sharia structuring at one of the world's largest banks, who spoke on the 
condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue said it was better for 
students to learn through apprenticeships with scholars who could trace their learning 
to Islam's roots: ‘I don't care whether they have a Ph.D. or not,’ he said. ‘The way 
traditional Islamic teaching has been handed down is not through certificates or 
degrees. You need to trace your teaching back to the Prophet. It's a lineage of 
understanding.’ 
Scholars thus represent a unique subaltern yet elite group whose knowledge is not acquired or 
legitimated through the channels of institutionalization or professionalization identified in 
research on other elites, be they working in finance (Hall et al. 2009) or in economic 
development (Larner and Craig 2005).   
 
The intersections of territorialized and embodied legalities 
We have argued that Shari’a scholars occupy a crucial position in constructing and 
navigating the complex territorial legalities that shape the development of IBF in different 
contexts. Here we deepen our analysis of agency to explore the constitutive intersections of 
territorialized legalities and embodied agency that produce and operationalize the 
cosmopolitan legalities of IBF.  To do this, it is important to appreciate some features of 
Shari’a law that frames scholars’ endeavors. As (Siddiqi 2006, n.p.) has argued,  
“Islamic economics was conceived in the early part of the twentieth century as an 
antidote to socialism and capitalism — an Islamic response to what were perceived as 
God-less western ideologies. The emphasis was on justice. Freedom from colonial 
rule and all that it meant in terms of exploitation and oppression was to be 
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accompanied by a return to Islam that stood for elimination of poverty and reduction 
in inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. The appeal in all this was to 
the objectives of Islam, the maqasid al-Shari’a. There were few references to fiqh, to 
Shari’a in the sense of laws and regulations as codified in early Islamic history”.  
As such, Shari’a law is an example of what May (2007,184) terms a “thick conception” of 
law in that it seeks “to establish a more normatively rich content for the concept”. He 
contrasts “thick” conceptions of law with “thin” conceptions that see the rule of law as 
“merely the imposition of a set of procedures that are legal in form”, as a largely procedural 
technique of regulation. In other words, Shari’a scholars work with a legal framework that 
sets out broad principles -- the avoidance of riba, gharar and maysir and the pursuit of social 
justice -- and not codified procedures that specify how such ends must be achieved. This 
framework leaves its mark on the governance of IBF in (at least) four ways.  
First, above and beyond the difficulties of complying with ‘local’ regulations of, say 
the OCC or the FSA, it is often not clear to bankers, regulators, customers or indeed Shari’a 
scholars whether a particular financial practice is ‘Islamic’. In such circumstances authority 
rests exclusively with scholars with a deep knowledge of Shari’a law who are mujtahid or 
qualified to practice Ijtihad (effort) to arrive at a consensus and issue a fatwa which then 
becomes part of Islamic jurisprudence. And whilst scholars may agree on basic principles, 
Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims have different schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), such as the 
four schools of fiqh within Sunni Islam (see e.g. Foster, 2010). Nonetheless, for all the legal 
diversity practiced by Shari’a scholars, the ‘Islamicness’ of IBF products is deemed crucial. 
As one of our interviewees put it, “the biggest stumbling block was whether this product is 
authentic or not, so what we did was, we got Shari’a scholars” (Source A).  
Second, it is in adjudicating on the ‘Islamicness’ of different products that Shari’a 
scholars produce what we have characterized as cosmopolitan legalities as they navigate the 
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shifting intersections of Shari’a and other bodies of law. Scholars work with IFIs subject to 
different legal, regulatory and cultural codes and juggle the (usually conflicting practical and 
religious) requirements, on the one hand, to harmonize IBF products with local codes in order 
to make them ‘work’ in particular contexts, while also, on the other hand, maintaining and 
(re-)asserting the ‘difference’ of Islamic vis-à-vis interest-based finance. In this respect, the 
similarities between Islamic and English common law (El Gamal 2006) have eased the 
development of IBF in the United Kingdom (Sources A, G, H) not least because some parts 
of English common law have roots in financial transactions of Islamic origin (Cattan 1955). 
English law is viewed as ‘flexible’ because it, “looks at the principles and finds ways to make 
things happen” (Source H).  Thus by way of ‘making things happen’, Shari’a scholars 
working for Global Bank
11
 sanctioned the introduction of different forms of Islamic mortgage 
in their U.S. and UK branches because of the differences in regulation in the two countries. 
One source (A) said of regulation,  
“it’s like your electrical plug. You go to different countries and they are all different. 
With all our globalization, we haven’t managed to create one global standard for 
electrical plugs, because everybody believes their plug is superior.”  
Third, these legalities are situated yet dynamic because as scholars interpret rules of 
fiqh in different contexts they are expected to pay attention to the broader objectives of 
Shari’a (Siddiqi, 2006). Scholars rely on qiyas (reasoning by analogy) to use the rulings of 
one event and apply them to another. They can also use three adaptive mechanisms -- 
departures from tradition -- because of local custom (‘urf), public interest (maslaha) or 
necessity (darura) (Al-Omar and Abdel-Haq 1996). Thus, to cite a famous example, in 
October 1999 Sheikh Abdullah al-Qaradawi invoked darura (necessity) when he issued a 
fatwa that permitted Muslims to buy a home with an interest-based mortgage if the house was 
for their use, was their only house and they had no other assets that would allow them to 
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purchase the house without a mortgage (Maurer 2006). The introduction of this anomaly -- 
the permissibility of interest-based mortgage products -- acknowledged the economic and 
legal geographies of the late 1990s when Muslims in the west wanting to purchase houses 
had few, if any, Shari’a-compliant mortgages available to them.  
 Fourth, and related, scholars are expected to monitor the consequences of their rulings 
and, if necessary, adapt them with hindsight. Thus, in November 2007, Sheikh Muhammad 
Taqi Usmani, head of AAOIFI’s 18 member SSB, ruled that roughly 85 percent of  Islamic 
sukuk (bonds) in circulation globally violated Islamic principles of risk- and profit-sharing 
because their structures too closely mirrored those of conventional bonds (Bassens, Derudder 
and Witlox 2011; Anwar 2008; Maurer 2010). AAOIFI rules are only binding in Bahrain, 
Dubai, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and Syria, but the ruling was rapidly transmitted 
around the globe through Shari’a scholars sitting on multiple SSBs. The Usmani ruling sent 
shock waves through global IBF markets and led to a contraction in new issues from over 
$40bn in 2007 to less than $10bn in 2009 (Fidler 2009). In London, uncertainty over their 
Shari’a compliance and the credit crunch slowed activity in sukuk markets (Walmsley 2010).  
Besides its economic impact, Usmani’s ruling was viewed as a further demonstration of the 
implacable authority of Shari’a scholars and their willingness to throw sand in the wheels of 
IBF’s expansion if they feel Islamic principles are being compromised. As Oliver Agha (in 
McLeod-Roberts 2009,1) argues, Usmani’s ruling on sukuk testifies to the ongoing “struggle 
for the soul of Islamic finance” as some scholars resist pressure to adapt IBF to the point 
where it is “indistinguishable from conventional finance”.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has explored the governance of IBF in two non-Muslim majority sites of its 
expansion in order to contribute to the literature on IBF, particularly its governance, and to 
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advance wider debates on the constitution of economic geographies. Our comparative 
analysis demonstrates some of the ways in which an alternative form of economic and 
religious rationality is being constructed and practised across diverse spatial contexts (in our 
case territories). Throughout, we have shunned separations of the social and economic as 
posited by the concept of embeddedness. Instead, we have deployed the concept of 
cosmopolitan legalities as a bridging device to capture the dynamic intersections of territory, 
financial practices, and embodied religious authorities in the form of Shari’a scholars.  More 
than demonstrating the significance of socio-spatial contexts or territory however, we have 
stressed the co-constitution of Islamic and interest-based financial practices as IBF has 
prompted regulatory shifts in both the United States and United Kingdom.  
 More broadly, our arguments have a number of implications for economic geography. 
First, IBF further testifies to the need to internationalize economic geography in a way that 
extends beyond calls for bridging economic geography and development geography (Murphy 
2008; Pollard et al 2009; Pollard, McEwan and Hughes 2011; Vira and James 2011) or the 
critique of simply western-only, modernization-oriented narratives.  Rather, IBF suggests that 
economic geographers can learn from research  on the relationship between civil society and 
economic development in South East Asia, Latin America and Africa, which has accorded 
religious faith a much more prominent role in economic development than is the case in 
usually secular economic geographic studies  (for an exception among geographers, see 
James, 2005). After all, while interest-based banking and finance certainly have their ‘iconic 
individuals’ (Hall et al. 2009), Shari’a scholars are a cadre of experts with a distinct authority 
derived from their religious status. Similarly, economic geographers can and should learn 
from the anthropological and economic sociological literatures that explore the mutual 
constitution of economic and religious practices, and which can be traced all the way back to 
at least the work of Max Weber. 
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Second and relatedly, our paper offers an intervention into the so-called process of 
‘post-secularization’ in ‘western societies’ (see Kong 2010). While interest-based finance has 
Judeo-Christian underpinnings (Maurer 2005, 2006; Pollard and Samers 2007), the 
development and governance of IBF may serve as additional fodder for debates around the 
issue of post-secularization. In other words, unlike conventional banking, IBF relies on an 
explicitly religious framework as a source of governance, which in principle may signal a 
new more socially responsible approach to finance or at least one that is legitimated 
differently.  
Third our analysis questions whether economic geographers have thus far engaged 
adequately with legalities as expressions of territory, or what Blomley (2004) calls the 
‘enmeshment of law and space’, or indeed through nascent literatures on lawyers and the 
production of space (Martin, Scherr and City 2010). We would argue that the concept of 
legalities is a useful device that allows us to hold in tension territoriality and agency and 
further work should explore the historical-geographical construction of different legalities 
that shape economic activity, not least because legalities have a particularly territorial quality 
to them. In this regard, Shari’a scholars are not somehow pre- or non-territorial. Their own 
agency is produced through their postcolonial context which they then bring to the legal 
systems of the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, we have established that these 
legalities are ensconced in territory, yet subject to diverse and cosmopolitan influences as 
well. In a world where sukuk traded in London and New York rest on English common law, 
but are subject to the decisions of a Shari’a scholar based in Pakistan, it may be the very 
moment to reflect critically on how territory, embodiment, and cosmopolitan legalities 
intersect to shape different sorts of economic activity. Perhaps of deeper concern, is how 
legalities associated with particular territories and embodied practices function to enable or 
dissuade so-called ‘alternative financial practices’ such as IBF. Territory and embodiment 
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may be pivotal to understanding why putatively more ethical alternatives thrive or do not 
thrive in particular spaces.  
Fourth and related, just as geographers exploring neoliberal globalization have moved 
away from generic claims about market expansion to produce richer, empirically grounded 
accounts of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and 
Ward, 2007; Leitner, Peck and Sheppard, 2007; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010), so too is there a 
need to document and not just assert the uneven and precarious realities of financial 
globalization. As Peck (2005, 161) argues, 
 “If the ideological project of neoliberal globalism rests on a (powerful yet 
misleading) vision of a flat-earth economy, comprised of free-trading, flexible agents, 
then a critical economic-geographic counterproject would seek strategically to survey 
the uneven landscape, to expose the cracks and fissures—what Block (2000) called 
“welds”—in this supposedly unitary system”. 
The development of IBF may as yet represent only a small series of fissures but 
understanding its socio-spatial formation is not simply a means of ‘provincializing’ western 
financial practices (Pollard and Samers 2007) or just part of the ‘imagineering’ (Lai 2006) 
that constructs emerging and/or ‘different’ financial markets as economically significant. 
Rather, we have tried to show how territorialized cosmopolitan legalities are integral to the 
development of IBF in the particular contexts of the United States and the United Kingdom, 
while at the same time producing regulatory changes that affect interest-based financial 
practices. The progressive possibilities of IBF rest not simply on how it adapts to different 
contexts (although that is certainly a large part of this interaction), but also on how its ‘moral 
economy’ is communicated through and retains its difference through its encounters with the 
institutional and knowledge architectures of non-Islamic states and interest-based banking 
systems. If nothing else, the rise of IBF since the 1990s in the west may contribute to a more 
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polycentric and cosmopolitan global financial architecture in the twenty first century. More 
than this, however, it raises critical questions about if, where, and when IBF can provide any 
kind of a more ‘socially just’ alternative to neoliberal financialization as opposed to merely 
translating it into Islamic norms and practices. This speaks to the question of a more critical 
cosmopolitanism with which de Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito as well as David 
Harvey (2009) are concerned. In other words, what sorts of ‘cosmopolitan practices’ might be 
more welcome than others? Whether or not IBF is to be embraced is a matter of considerable 
debate, both among Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and is perhaps a conversation that 
requires a different paper. However, in the aftermath of the US-UK sub-prime crisis which 
has crippled public sector finances in both countries and led to widespread job losses, wage 
freezes and declining living standards for many, locating examples of ‘actually existing’ 
(financial) cosmopolitanism might lead us one step further down the road to creating different 
economic and financial possibilities.   
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Notes
                                                 
1
 We recognize that the concepts of ‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘neoliberal financialization’ are the subject of extended 
debate (see for example, Sheppard and Leitner 2010). We therefore use this term reservedly, acknowledging the 
caveats expressed in the literature.  
2
 Jones’ arguments find companionship in some earlier work in economic sociology, economic geography, and 
in governmentality studies, whether it is the more general focus on de-centred non-state actors or the 
‘transnational capitalist class’ (e.g. Sklair 2001, Miller and Rose 2008, Dean 1999). 
3
 SSBs are pre-requisites for admission into the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB). 
4
 For example, the ’33 percent rule’ stipulates that debt to equity ratios of companies in which investments are 
held should not exceed 33 percent.  
5
 BA Small Grant number SG 45073. 
 
6
 The data reported refers only to institutions operating in the U.S. and UK offering Islamic financial products 
that have either individual Shari’a scholars or SSBs that vet their products and procedures.   
7
 ‘Midwestern Community Bank’ is a pseudonym; we use pseudonyms from this point onwards to refer to the 
banks in which our interviewees worked.  
8
 Any person acting as a Director in an FSA authorized firm is required to be registered under the FSA’s 
Approved Person Rules (which assess their competency and identify any conflicts of interest). 
9
 Stamp Duty Land Tax is a transactions tax that applies to transfers of UK land and buildings. 
10
 See his speech on May 19, 2004 at the Islamic Financial Services Industry and Global Regulatory 
Environment Summit in London. 
(http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speechesandarticles/a_speech_by_hrh_the_prince_of_wales_at_the_islamic_
financial_85.html) 
11
 This is a pseudonym. 
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Table 1 Islamic Financial Institutions in western countries and offshore centers (2010)  
 
Country Number of Institutions 
UK 22 
USA 15 
Australia 4 
France 3 
South Africa 3 
Switzerland 3 
Canada 1 
Cayman Islands 1 
Germany 1 
Ireland 1 
Luxembourg 1 
Russia 1 
 
 
Source: Adapted from IFLS 2010 and authors’ research.  
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 Table 2 Major forms of Islamic financial contract 
Product Type Description 
Ijara Leasing A contract under which a 
bank leases assets for a 
specified rent and term. This 
can take the form of a lease 
purchase contract in which 
each payment includes a 
portion of the agreed asset 
price. 
Mudarabah Profit and loss sharing A trustee type contract in 
which a financial institution 
provides finance for a client 
who provides all the labor for 
setting up the business. The 
financial institution is 
guaranteed a share of the 
profits but assumes 
responsibility for all losses. 
In many cases a manager 
(mudarib) is appointed to 
manage the business. 
Murabaha Debt A cost-plus purchase and 
resale transaction in which a 
bank buys/takes title to a 
desired commodity from a 
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third party and resells it at a 
predetermined higher price to 
the client. 
Musharakah Profit and loss sharing An equity partnership in 
which each partner 
contributes capital to a 
project and shares profit/loss 
in pre-agreed proportions. 
Qard hasan Debt A loan which is returned at 
the end of the agreed period 
without any interest or share 
in the profit or loss of the 
business. 
Sukuk Bond An asset-backed security that 
gives investors a share of an 
asset and exposure to its 
cashflow and risk.  
Takaful Insurance A pool of donations in a fund 
that is used to indemnify 
each of the participants 
against certain losses. 
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Table 3 Most prominent Shari’a Scholars, by SSB membership and region, August 2008 
SSB Memberships Europe Middle 
East 
Asia-
Pacific 
North 
America 
Africa Total 
Sheikh Nizam Yaquby 16 21 5 7 0 49 
Dr Mohammed Ali Elgari 
 
7 21 4 9 0 41 
Dr. Muhammad Imran Ashraf Usmani 8 12 3 8 0 31 
Shaikh Dr. Abdul Ghuddah 8 15 1 7 0 31 
Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar 4 9 9 3 1 26 
 
Source: Authors’ research 
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Figure 1: Profile of Sheikh Nizam Yaquby 
 
 
 
Sheikh Nizam Yaquby is a graduate in Economics and Comparative Religion from McGill 
University (Canada) and has a PhD in Islamic Law from the University of Wales. In addition 
to his native Arabic, he speaks Farsi, English and Urdu. He works from an office in the back 
of an electronics shop in Manama, Bahrain. 
Yaquby sits on numerous Shariah Boards, including those of the Dow Jones Islamic Index, 
HSBC Amanah, Citi-Islamic, Abu-Dhabi Islamic bank and the Manama-based Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the most respected 
body setting international standards in Islamic finance.  
In February, 2007 he won the Euromoney Award for “Outstanding Contribution to Islamic 
Finance”. 
 
Sheikh Yaquby is frequently called upon to consult with governmental and regulatory 
authorities on issues related to Islamic finance, and he is a regular speaker at seminars and 
conferences worldwide.  
 
Bloomberg described Sheikh Nizam Yaquby as “the gatekeeper to the $1trillion market for 
managing Muslim wealth”, while the Wall Street Journal describes him as “one of Islamic 
finance’s foremost scholars”.  
 
 
Sources: Author research, Abbas (2008a, b), Shariah Capital Inc. (2010).  
